THE NEW TORT OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
A NEW LEGAL CLAIM NOW EXISTS FOR VICTIMS OF COERCIVE CONTROL
Have you ever wondered what legal options exist for a spouse who experienced years of control, isolation, and manipulation, without a single incident of physical violence? For a long time, the law asked a fairly blunt question when someone wanted to sue a partner over abuse during a marriage: did that partner physically hurt you?
If the answer was yes, legal options existed, though the financial damages awarded through non-family legal proceedings were often low compared to the harm done. If the answer was no, and what happened instead was financial control, isolation from family, monitoring, and a slow erosion of confidence and freedom, the family law courts had no specified remedy for it.
That gap has now closed. In Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a new tort called intimate partner violence, built specifically to capture coercive control, the pattern of conduct that leaves no bruises.
This guide lays out what the Court decided, what the new tort requires, and what the decision means going forward.
Background: The Case Behind the Decision
Kuldeep Kaur Ahluwalia and Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia (the “Parties”) married in India in 1999 and moved to Canada shortly thereafter. The Parties had two children and a home in Brampton, Ontario. Over sixteen years of marriage, the trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia controlled nearly every part of his wife's life. Mr. Ahluwalia collected Ms. Ahluwalia’s income, monitored her spending, prevented her from pursuing further education, isolated her from her family, and withheld communication until she complied with his demands. Physical violence occurred on three occasions (2000, 2008, and 2013), which the trial judge described as part of a broader pattern of conditioning.
Ms. Ahluwalia brought her claim herself, without a lawyer. The trial judge (Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 2022 ONSC 1303) recognized a new tort of "family violence" and awarded her $150,000 in financial damages: $50,000 compensatory, $50,000 aggravated, and $50,000 punitive.
The Ontario Court of Appeal (2023 ONCA 476) took a different view. It held that a new tort was not necessary because the existing torts of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress already captured the husband's conduct. It reduced the award by $50,000, removing the punitive damages component.
Ms. Ahluwalia appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. On May 15, 2026, the majority (written by Justice Kasirer, with Chief Justice Wagner and Justices Martin,
O'Bonsawin, and Moreau concurring) allowed the appeal in part and recognized the new tort of intimate partner violence. Justice Karakatsanis concurred separately. Justice Jamal, joined by Justices Côté and Rowe, dissented and would have dismissed the appeal.
The Court described intimate partner violence as a pervasive social problem that deserves the full attention of the law. The majority's reasoning centred on a distinction the existing torts could not capture: assault and battery relate to discrete acts, but coercive control is not a discrete act. Rather, coercive control is a sustained deprivation of a person's freedom to live as an equal partner, and that loss of autonomy is itself the wrong the new tort is meant to address.
What the New Tort Requires
To succeed under the tort of intimate partner violence, a party needs to establish three elements, which are listed below. The standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard, meaning that on a balance of probabilities, the claim has to be more likely true than not.
1. The conduct occurred within an intimate partnership, or after it ended. This covers marriages, common-law relationships, and long-term partnerships. A marriage certificate is not required, and the claim does not end at separation. Conduct that continues after a relationship ends, including using court proceedings as a tool of ongoing harassment, can still count.
2. The alleged abused engaged in the conduct intentionally. A party does not need to prove the partner had a deliberate long-term plan to control them. The conduct itself needs to have been chosen. Monitoring a partner's spending for years or repeatedly showing up at a partner's workplace to pressure them into quitting are not accidents.
3. A reasonable person, looking at the behaviour as a whole, would view it as coercive control. This is the element most likely to be contested in future cases. Courts assess the cumulative effect of the conduct rather than isolated incidents, asking whether it deprived the abused party of the freedom to live as an equal partner. Financial control, isolation, surveillance, conditioning through fear, and post-separation litigation abuse can all support this element.
A party does not need a psychiatric diagnosis related to the abuse, hospital records, or a single documented incident of physical violence. The loss of autonomy and equality within the relationship is itself the compensable harm once the above three elements are established.
What Changed as a Result of This Decision
Before Ahluwalia
Each incident was assessed separately.
Physical harm was usually required to ground a claim.
Parties often needed a diagnosable illness relating to the abuse to support a damages award.
Financial control on its own was rarelycompensated.
Abuse that continued after separation was difficult to pursue as a legal claim.
A pattern of control was largely invisible to the law, since no cause of action was built to see it.
After Ahluwalia
The whole pattern of conduct is assessed together, as a single course of behaviour.
No physical harm is required at all.
No diagnosis is required.
Financial control is expressly covered as a form of coercive conduct.
Post-separation abuse, including the use of litigation itself as a tool of control, is captured.
Coercive control is the basis of the claim itself.
The Limits of the New Tort
The Court was careful to define what the new tort does not cover. A difficult marriage, an unequal dynamic, infidelity, emotional neglect, and the ordinary strain of a relationship breaking down do not amount to coercive control on their own. The tort is not a vehicle for regulating unhappy marriages into healthier ones.
What the tort targets is conduct that, taken as a whole, systematically deprived one partner of the freedom to live as an equal. There is a meaningful difference between a partner who expresses strong preferences and a partner who creates an environment where disagreement consistently carries a cost. The first describes an ordinary relationship dynamic. The second describes what this tort was designed to address.
The Court built in a safeguard against misuse of the claim as well. Acts of resistance, such as a victim standing up for themselves, leaving, or refusing to comply with demands, do not become coercive control simply because they caused the other party distress. The tort is anchored in domination, and a person defending themselves against domination is not considered to be causing family violence under this framework.
What This Means Going Forward
Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16 gives Canadian courts a legal vocabulary for harm that previously fell outside the reach of family law remedies. Parties who experienced financial control, isolation, surveillance, or psychological conditioning, without physical
violence, now have a defined path to a civil remedy, supported by the highest court in the country.
If you believe you experienced coercive control within an intimate relationship, understanding how the three elements of this new tort apply to your circumstances is an important first step. Contact us at info@mpeaklaw.ca or 604-746-3374 to schedule a consultation with a family law lawyer who can help you assess your options.
